MARITIME PIRACY

THE word ‘pirate’ has this misleading habit of conjuring up illusions of a colorful character, perhaps even a lovable rogue with a salty tongue and a jaunty air. The International Maritime Board (IMB), however, dryly defines piracy as the act of boarding any vessel with an intent to commit theft or any other crime and to use force for it.

The resurgence of piracy in the late 20th century coincided with a worldwide reduction in naval fleets along with a corresponding increase in mercantile shipping. Naval ships are expensive to maintain and operate, and require support bases located in the general area of interest with a continuous military presence, all of which became politically and economically unviable in the post-colonial world. The reasons for the emergence of insurgent groups are the same all over the world—exit of colonial powers from underdeveloped countries, leaving behind a poor political and administrative system, ill equipped to compete on a global level; an uneducated population; the entry of vested interests; and the emergence of power factions armed with weapons, funded by multinational corporations, seeking to exploit natural resources, leading to civil strife and a breakdown of law and order.

Somalia’s is a classic case where sea-pirates run virtually unchecked in the absence of any form of governmental control. Civil war has raged for twenty years, and the federal government controls only a small part of territory around the capital while the coastal regions remain autonomous. Already poor and war torn, the region suffers from repeated droughts. Somalia possesses the longest coastline in Africa and sits at a strategic position dominating the entry into the Indian Ocean from the Gulf of Aden. The absence of a Somali navy or coast guard was reportedly exploited by European firms to dump toxic wastes, effectively killing off the livelihood of local fishermen in those areas. Elsewhere, foreign fishing vessels illegally harvested the locals’ fishing grounds. Initially grouped together to fight off illegal foreign trawlers, the fishermen, who included former soldiers, soon found an easier, more profitable catch—the large number of slow-moving, unguarded merchant vessels carrying high value cargo and passing fairly near their coast.

Although naval forces from various countries have been deployed off the Horn of Africa (HOA) for the last three years, their presence has had only partial success. There is no doubt that naval ships have been successful in disrupting pirate attacks and have escorted many merchant ships to safety. However, their success in extracting ransom payments for captured ships has ensured that pirate gangs are never short of recruits. That the pirates have begun to see themselves in a patriotic mould is evident from names like National Volunteer Coast Guard and Somali Patriotic Movement adopted by pirate gangs.

Recent incidents of piracy have shown that Somali pirates are moving farther afield, away from their home coast right up to the Lakshadweep Islands. This spells trouble for India since interrogation of captured pirates has indicated a tie up between the Somali Al Shabab militia and the LeT. There is also evidence that pirates have links with the Al Qaida.

Piracy has pushed up the cost of insurance premium for cargo transiting piracy-prone areas. Increased naval patrolling has driven up the operating costs of navies who have also been compelled to acquire additional craft to replace those now almost permanently engaged in antipiracy patrols. And still, all this is not enough.

Although Somalia has reportedly permitted navies of some countries, including India, to enter their territorial waters in pursuit of pirates, most countries shy away from taking direct action within another country’s jurisdiction.

The similarity between piracy off the Horn of Africa and the Naxal problem in India is startling. Both are the result of economic exploitation of the peasantry. Police action in both cases has not been effective. The solutions in one case may therefore also provide lessons for the other.

A lasting solution is, however, far more complex and lies somewhere between naval patrols, punitive legislative action, economic aid, enforcing respect for the territorial integrity and rights of a nation unable to do so and political and administrative strengthening of one of the most impoverished and dangerous nations on earth.

(This article appeared in the supplementary edition, The Indian Navy, of the Indian Express on December 4, 2011)