10 YEARS AFTER 9/11: IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

The tenth anniversary of September 11, 2001, or what in the American lexicon has become '9/11' is unspooling against the backdrop of the Delhi terror attack (September 6 ) and this is an appropriate occasion to reflect over the enormity of the slow-motion collapse of the Twin Towers in Manhattan and the beginning of the US-led war against terror. The strategic orientation and texture of the world has changed enormously over this decade due to the post 9/11 fallout and the implications for India are complex and considerable.

At the outset, it merits recall that for India, the scourge of state sponsored terror does not originate with 9/11 - as was the case for the US - and neither is it likely to find closure in a similar manner and the Delhi High Court blast is illustrative of this reality. However at a strategic level, there are three definitive strands whose implications need to be considered objectively.

It is one of those paradoxes of the 20th century international relations that the world's oldest and largest democracies, the US and India, had an 'estranged' relationship for over 50 years and the estrangement was driven by their divergent security and strategic perceptions on two major issues. The nuclear nettle was the more visible and notwithstanding the fury and rage that the White House exuded following May 1974 (India's PNE) and May 1998 (the Shakti nuclear tests) respectively, this issue was reasonably resolved by the Bush-Manmohan Singh civilian nuclear accord of July 2005.

Terrorism is the second major divisive issue and here the US and India were firmly on opposite sides of the table. From 1993 onwards, when SST acquired a distinctive virulence with the first attack on Mumbai, the US and India saw the threat differently. I recall from personal experience that the US national security apex during Clinton administration (1993-1996) saw the issue as an extension of the Hindu-Muslim communal divide in the sub-continent and the US establishment went out of its way to ignore or reject any terror linkage with the Pakistan military establishment. However after 9/11, the US prioritised terror and the non-state entity by way of the al-Qaeda and as exemplified by Osama bin Laden. Thus the beginning of a correspondence between US and Indian security interests apropos one form of terror beckoned - but this was short-lived.

In late 2001, when the US began its military operations against the Taliban in Kabul - the linkage and support being provided by the Pakistan military was ignored. Finally it took the audacity of the bin Laden episode - the fact that this most wanted fugitive was safely ensconced in a Pak military cantonment - to make the Beltway confront the duplicity of the Pakistan military over support to certain jihadi terror groups. It remains to be seen how the political leadership on both sides will harmonise their approaches to the challenge of terror. At the time of writing, the US is on high-alert over the possibility of a daring jihadi attack to mark the 9/11 anniversary - while India is still reeling over the Delhi attack.

The second major post 9/11 development has been the emergence of China over the last decade. From 2001 to 2011, the relative contrast in the GDP figures is striking. From a GDP of $1.16 trillion - or a little under 10% of the US GDP at the time, ($10.28 trillion) the Chinese GDP in 2010 is estimated to be $6.04 trillion, or a little over 40% of the sole post-Cold War 'hegemon'. The steady rise of China and its related comprehensive national power indices have significant implications for bilateral relationship between Beijing and Delhi at a time when the US is in relative decline and poor fiscal health. The big picture of the post-9/11 world is the likely emergence of a tri-polar, single state, economic-trade domain inhabited by China, the US and India. The spectrum about what the world will look like over the next decade plus straddles the G-2 school (China and the US) to a concert of democracies and now the G-1 moment, wherein China dominates the rest of the grid.

China's deepening strategic relationship with Pakistan is yet another 9/11 fall-out and while it has now become routine to refer to Pakistan military's ability to hunt with the US hound and run with the jihadi hare, in strategic terms, Pakistan has done the ultimate Houdini. Islamabad has the rare distinction of being concurrently designated a major non-NATO US ally, even while the relationship with China is described as 'one-nation, two countries'. This alliance has now overlapped into one entity and Delhi needs to ponder over the implications of this nexus.

The third strand that merits deep introspection is the post 9/11 perspicacity and character of the Indian collective. India's grapple with state sponsored terror goes back to May 1990, when the Pak military embarked upon nuclear weapon enabled terror. Yet over the last 21 years, and more so after the December 2001 Parliament attack and the Mumbai tragedy of 2008, the Indian state has not found the political resolve or the professional competence to quarantine the scourge of terror. True, the US has the advantage of being insulated by two vast oceans - but that cannot be the only reason for ensuring that there has been no major attack on the US mainland since 9/11.

(This article first appeared in The Economic Times on September 10, 2011)